diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | kernels/gradm/PKGBUILD | 39 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernels/gradm/learn_config | 169 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernels/gradm/policy | 487 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernels/gradm/usr.patch | 115 |
4 files changed, 810 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernels/gradm/PKGBUILD b/kernels/gradm/PKGBUILD new file mode 100644 index 000000000..52e0582b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernels/gradm/PKGBUILD @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +# Contributors: +# Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> +# henning mueller <henning@orgizm.net> +# s1gma, Ahmad24, maxrp + +pkgname=gradm +pkgver=3.0 +_timestamp=201311242038 +pkgrel=2 +pkgdesc='Administrative interface for the grsecurity Role Based Access Control system' +arch=(i686 x86_64 mips64el) +url=http://grsecurity.net/ +license=(GPL2) +depends=(pam) +source=( + http://grsecurity.net/stable/$pkgname-$pkgver-$_timestamp.tar.gz + usr.patch + learn_config + policy +) + +build() { + cd "$srcdir/$pkgname" + patch -Np1 < ../usr.patch + sed -i -e 's/^CFLAGS :=/CFLAGS +=/' -e 's:sbin:usr/bin:' Makefile + make +} + +package() { + cd "$srcdir/$pkgname" + make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install + cp "$startdir"/{learn_config,policy} "$pkgdir/etc/grsec" + rm -rf "$pkgdir/dev" +} + +sha256sums=('9d9040ef2be90b6a4db5b68ba5b7bc658cbbcdb8c71c643b8f95373e4a892e55' + '7342323d2da3724afe745506690a1a5b194f3f0e959811ca320d820bf74c9ffa' + 'ec8e824e8a29a67be76bf853814ee85e80c4063009e5693d5db8cdb45bd45813' + '61c0e84098e8386e5496dafce559558adef32e2a4a1241a9fa3bd56eab192dcd') diff --git a/kernels/gradm/learn_config b/kernels/gradm/learn_config new file mode 100644 index 000000000..24c4cbc25 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernels/gradm/learn_config @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +#This configuration file aids the learning process by tweaking +#the learning algorithm for specific paths. +# +#It accepts lines in the form of <command> <pathname> +#Where <command> can be inherit-learn, no-learn, inherit-no-learn, +#high-reduce-path, dont-reduce-path, protected-path, high-protected-path, +#read-protected-path, and always-reduce-path +# +#inherit-learn, no-learn, and inherit-no-learn operate only with +#full learning +# +#high-reduce-path, dont-reduce-path, always-reduce-path, protected-path, +#and high-protected-path operate on both full and and regular learning +#(subject and role learning) +# +#inherit-learn changes the learning process for the specified path +#by throwing all learned accesses for every binary executed by the +#processes contained in the pathname into the subject specified +#by the pathname. This is useful for cron in the case of full +#system learning, so that scripts that eventually end up executing +#mv or rm with privilege don't cause the root policy to grant +#that privilege to mv or rm in all cases. +# +#no-learn allows processes within the path to perform any operation +#that normal system usage would allow without restriction. If +#a process is generating a huge number of learning logs, it may be +#best to use this command on that process and configure its policy +#manually. +# +#inherit-no-learn combines the above two cases, such that processes +#within the specified path will be able to perform any normal system +#operation without restriction as will any binaries executed by +#these processes. +# +#high-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process +#to weight in favor of reducing accesses for this path +# +#dont-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process +#so that it will never reduce accesses for this path +# +#always-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process +#so that the path specified will always have all files and directories +#within it reduced to the path specified. +# +#protected-path specifies a path on your system that is considered an +#important resource. Any process that modifies one of these paths +#is given its own subject in the learning process, facilitating +#a secure policy. +# +#read-protected-path specifies a path on your system that contains +#sensitive information. Any process that reads one of these paths is +#given its own subject in the learning process, facilitating a secure +#policy. +# +#high-protected-path specifies a path that should be hidden from +#all processes but those that access it directly. It is recommended +#to use highly sensitive files for this command. +# +#regular expressions are not supported for pathnames in this config file +# +# +# uncomment this next line if you don't wish to generate a policy that +# restricts roles to specific IP ranges: +# dont-learn-allowed-ips +# +# to write out your generated policy such that roles are split into separate +# files by the name of the role (within user/group directories), uncomment +# the next line: +# split-roles + +always-reduce-path /dev/pts +always-reduce-path /var/spool/qmailscan/tmp +always-reduce-path /var/spool/exim4 +always-reduce-path /var/run/screen +always-reduce-path /usr/share/locale +always-reduce-path /usr/share/zoneinfo +always-reduce-path /usr/share/terminfo +always-reduce-path /tmp +always-reduce-path /var/tmp + +high-reduce-path /dev/.udev +high-reduce-path /dev/mapper +high-reduce-path /dev/snd +high-reduce-path /proc +high-reduce-path /usr/lib +high-reduce-path /usr/lib/tls +high-reduce-path /usr/lib/libreoffice +high-reduce-path /usr/lib32 +high-reduce-path /usr/lib32/tls +high-reduce-path /usr/lib64 +high-reduce-path /usr/lib64/tls +high-reduce-path /var/lib +high-reduce-path /usr/bin +high-reduce-path /usr/sbin +high-reduce-path /usr/local/share +high-reduce-path /usr/local/bin +high-reduce-path /usr/local/sbin +high-reduce-path /usr/local/etc +high-reduce-path /usr/local/lib +high-reduce-path /usr/share +high-reduce-path /usr/X11R6/lib +high-reduce-path /var/lib/openldap-data +high-reduce-path /var/lib/krb5kdc + +dont-reduce-path / +dont-reduce-path /home +dont-reduce-path /dev +dont-reduce-path /usr +dont-reduce-path /var +dont-reduce-path /opt + +protected-path /boot +protected-path /dev/log +protected-path /etc +protected-path /opt +protected-path /root +protected-path /run +protected-path /sys +protected-path /usr +protected-path /var + +read-protected-path /etc/ssh +read-protected-path /proc/kallsyms +read-protected-path /proc/kcore +read-protected-path /proc/slabinfo +read-protected-path /proc/modules +read-protected-path /usr/lib/modules +read-protected-path /usr/lib64/modules +read-protected-path /boot +read-protected-path /etc/shadow +read-protected-path /etc/shadow- +read-protected-path /etc/gshadow +read-protected-path /etc/gshadow- +read-protected-path /sys + +high-protected-path /etc/ssh +high-protected-path /proc/kcore +high-protected-path /proc/sys +high-protected-path /proc/bus +high-protected-path /proc/slabinfo +high-protected-path /proc/modules +high-protected-path /proc/kallsyms +high-protected-path /etc/passwd +high-protected-path /etc/shadow +high-protected-path /var/backups +high-protected-path /etc/shadow- +high-protected-path /etc/gshadow +high-protected-path /etc/gshadow- +high-protected-path /var/log +high-protected-path /dev/mem +high-protected-path /dev/kmem +high-protected-path /dev/port +high-protected-path /dev/log +high-protected-path /sys +high-protected-path /etc/ppp +high-protected-path /etc/samba/smbpasswd +#to protect kernel images +high-protected-path /boot +high-protected-path /usr/lib/modules +high-protected-path /usr/lib64/modules +high-protected-path /usr/src + +inherit-learn /etc/cron.d +inherit-learn /etc/cron.hourly +inherit-learn /etc/cron.daily +inherit-learn /etc/cron.weekly +inherit-learn /etc/cron.monthly +inherit-learn /etc/init.d +inherit-learn /etc/rc.d/init.d diff --git a/kernels/gradm/policy b/kernels/gradm/policy new file mode 100644 index 000000000..55a5811c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernels/gradm/policy @@ -0,0 +1,487 @@ +#sample default policy for grsecurity +# +# Role flags: +# A -> This role is an administrative role, thus it has special privilege normal +# roles do not have. In particular, this role bypasses the +# additional ptrace restrictions +# N -> Don't require authentication for this role. To access +# the role, use gradm -n <rolename> +# s -> This role is a special role, meaning it does not belong to a +# user or group, and does not require an enforced secure policy +# base to be included in the ruleset +# u -> This role is a user role +# g -> This role is a group role +# G -> This role can use gradm to authenticate to the kernel +# A policy for gradm will automatically be added to the role +# T -> Enable TPE for this role +# l -> Enable learning for this role +# P -> Use PAM authentication for this role. +# R -> Enable persistence of special role. Normal special roles will +# be removed upon exit of the process that entered the role, or +# upon unauth (this is what changes the apache process' role back +# to its normal role after being restarted from the admin role, for +# instance). Role persistence allows a special role to be used for +# system shutdown, as the point at which the admin's shell/SSH +# session is terminated won't cause the rest of the shutdown +# sequence to execute with reduced privilege. Do *NOT* use this +# flag with any role that does anything but shut the system down. +# This role will also be transferred to the init process upon +# writing to /dev/initctl. This allows init to execute the rc +# scripts for shutdown with the necessary privilege. +# For usability reasons, we allow the removal of persistence through +# the normal unauth process (so persistence only survives exit). +# +# a role can only be one of user, group, or special +# +# role_allow_ip IP/optional netmask +# eg: role_allow_ip 192.168.1.0/24 +# You can have as many of these per role as you want +# They restrict the use of a role to a list of IPs. If a user +# is on the system that would normally get the role does not +# belong to those lists of IPs, the system falls back through +# its method of determining a role for the user +# +# Role hierarchy +# user -> group -> default +# First a user role attempts to match, if one is not found, +# a group role attempts to match, if one is not found, +# the default role is used. +# +# role_transitions <special role 1> <special role 2> ... <special role n> +# eg: role_transitions www_admin dns_admin +# +# role transitions specify which special roles a given role is allowed +# to authenticate to. This applies to special roles that do not +# require password authentication as well. If a user tries to +# authenticate to a role that is not within his transition table, he +# will receive a permission denied error +# +# Nested subjects +# subject /bin/su:/bin/bash:/bin/cat +# / rwx +# +CAP_ALL +# grant privilege to specific processes if they are executed +# within a trusted path. In this case, privilege is +# granted if /bin/cat is executed from /bin/bash, which is +# executed from /bin/su. +# +# Configuration inheritance on nested subjects +# nested subjects inherit rules from their parents. In the +# example above, the nested subject would inherit rules +# from the nested subject for /bin/su:/bin/bash, +# and the subject /bin/su +# View the 1.9.x documentation for more information on +# configuration inheritance +# +# new object modes: +# m -> allow creation of setuid/setgid files/directories +# and modification of files/directories to be setuid/setgid +# M -> audit the setuid/setgid creation/modification +# c -> allow creation of the file/directory +# C -> audit the creation +# d -> allow deletion of the file/directory +# D -> audit the deletion +# p -> reject all ptraces to this object +# l -> allow a hardlink at this path +# (hardlinking requires at a minimum c and l modes, and the target +# link cannot have any greater permission than the source file) +# L -> audit link creation +# f -> needed to mark the pipe used for communication with init +# to transfer the privilege of the persistent role; only valid +# within a persistent role. Transfer only occurs when the file is +# opened for writing +# +# new subject modes: +# O -> disable "writable library" restrictions for this task +# t -> allow this process to ptrace any process (use with caution) +# r -> relax ptrace restrictions (allows process to ptrace processes +# other than its own descendants) +# i -> enable inheritance-based learning for this subject, causing +# all accesses of this subject and anything it executes to be placed +# in this subject, and inheritance flags added to executable objects +# in this subject +# a -> allow this process to talk to the /dev/grsec device +# s -> enable AT_SECURE when entering this subject +# (enables the same environment sanitization that occurs in glibc +# upon execution of a suid binary) +# x -> allows executable anonymous shared memory for this subject +# +# user/group transitions: +# You may now specify what users and groups a given subject can +# transition to. This can be done on an inclusive or exclusive basis. +# Omitting these rules allows a process with proper privilege granted by +# capabilities to transition to any user/group. +# +# Examples: +# subject /bin/su +# user_transition_allow root spender +# group_transition_allow root spender +# subject /bin/su +# user_transition_deny evilhacker +# subject /bin/su +# group_transition_deny evilhacker1 evilhacker2 +# +# Domains: +# With domains you can combine users that don't share a common +# GID as well as groups so that they share a single policy +# Domains work just like roles, with the only exception being that +# the line starting with "role" is replaced with one of the following: +# domain somedomainname u user1 user2 user3 user4 ... usern +# domain somedomainname g group1 group2 group3 group4 ... groupn +# +# Inverted socket policies: +# Rules such as +# connect ! www.google.com:80 stream tcp +# are now allowed, which allows you to specify that a process can connect to anything +# except to port 80 of www.google.com with a stream tcp socket +# the inverted socket matching also works on bind rules +# +# INADDR_ANY overriding +# You can now force a given subject to bind to a particular IP address on the machine +# This is useful for some chrooted environments, to ensure that the source IP they +# use is one of your choosing +# to use, add a line like: +# ip_override 192.168.0.1 +# +# Per-interface socket policies: +# Rules such as +# bind eth1:80 stream tcp +# bind eth0#1:22 stream tcp +# are now allowed, giving you the ability to tie specific socket rules +# to a single interface (or by using the inverted rules, all but one +# interface). Virtual interfaces are specified by the <ifname>#<vindex> +# syntax. If an interface is specified, no IP/netmask or host may be +# specified for the rule. +# +# Allowing additional socket families: +# Before v2.2.1 of the RBAC system, a subject that specified +# connect/bind rules limited only the socket usage of IPv4, allowing +# any other socket families to be used. Starting with v2.2.1 of the +# RBAC system, when connect/bind rules are used, additional rules +# will be required to unlock the use of additional socket families +# (outside of the common unix family). Multiple families can be +# specified per line. +# To enable use of IPv6, add the line: +# sock_allow_family ipv6 +# To enable use of netlink, add the line: +# sock_allow_family netlink +# To enable all other families, add the line: +# sock_allow_family all +# +# New learning system: +# To learn on a given subject: add l (the letter l, not the number 1) +# to the subject mode +# If you want to learn with the most restrictive policy, use the +# following: +# subject /path/to/bin lo +# / h +# -CAP_ALL +# connect disabled +# bind disabled +# Resource learning is also supported, so lines like +# RES_AS 0 0 +# can be used to learn a particular resource +# +# To learn on a given role, add l to the role mode +# For both of these, to enable learning, enable the system like: +# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -E +# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the +# learning phase with: +# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy +# To use full system learning, enable the system like: +# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs +# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the +# learning phase with: +# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy +# +# New PaX flag format (replaces PaX subject flags): +# PaX flags can be forced on or off, regardless of the flags on the +# binary, by using + or - before the following PaX flag names: +# PAX_SEGMEXEC +# PAX_PAGEEXEC +# PAX_MPROTECT +# PAX_RANDMMAP +# PAX_EMUTRAMP +# +# New feature for easier policy maintenance: +# replace <variable name> <replace string> +# e.g.: +# replace CVSROOT /home/cvs +# now $(CVSROOT) can be used in any subject or object pathname, like: +# $(CVSROOT)/grsecurity r +# This will translate to /home/cvs/grsecurity r +# This feature makes it easier to update policies by naming specific +# paths by their function, then only having to update those paths once +# to have it affect a large number of subjects/objects. +# +# capability auditing / log suppression +# use of a capability can be audited by adding "audit" to the line, eg: +# +CAP_SYS_RAWIO audit +# log suppression for denial of a capbility can be done by adding "suppress": +# -CAP_SYS_RAWIO suppress +# +# Per-role umask enforcement: +# If you have a user that you want to be assured cannot accidentally +# create a file that others can read (a confidentiality issue) +# add the following under the role declaration: +# role_umask 077 +# any normal octal umask may be specified +# Note that unlike the normal umask, this umask will also apply +# to the permissions one can chmod/fchmod a file to +# +# Note that the omission of any feature of a role or subject +# results in a default-allow +# For instance, if no capability rules are added, an implicit +CAP_ALL is used +# +# Commonly-used objects can be defined and used in multiple subjects +# As an example, we'll create a variable out of a list of objects +# and their associated permissions that RBAC enforces +define grsec_denied { + /boot h + /dev/grsec h + /dev/kmem h + /dev/mem h + /dev/port h + /etc/grsec h + /proc/kcore h + /proc/slabinfo h + /proc/modules h + /proc/kallsyms h + # hide and suppress logs about accessing this path + /usr/lib/modules hs + /etc/ssh h +} +# usage: +# $grsec_denied + +role shutdown sARG +subject / rvka + / + /dev + /dev/urandom r + /dev/random r + /etc r + /usr rx + /proc r + $grsec_denied + -CAP_ALL + connect disabled + bind disabled + +subject /usr/lib/systemd/systemd rvkao + / rwcdmlxi +subject /usr/bin/systemctl rvkao + / rwcdmlxi + /dev/initctl rwf + /run/initctl rwf + +# Make sure to unauthenticate with gradm -u from +# the admin role after restarting a service +# The service started will run with admin +# privileges until you run gradm -u or your shell exits + +role admin sA +subject / rvka + / rwcdmlxi + +role default G +role_transitions admin shutdown +subject / + / r + /opt rx + /home rwxcd + /mnt rw + /dev + /dev/urandom r + /dev/random r + /dev/zero rw + /dev/input rw + /dev/psaux rw + /dev/null rw + /dev/tty? rw + /dev/console rw + /dev/tty rw + /dev/pts rw + /dev/ptmx rw + /dev/dsp rw + /dev/mixer rw + /dev/initctl rw + /dev/fd0 r + /dev/cdrom r + /usr rx +# compilation of kernel code should be done within the admin role + /usr/src h + /etc rx + /proc rwx + /proc/sys r + /sys h + /root r + /run r + /tmp rwcd + /var rwxcd + /var/tmp rwcd + /var/log r +# hide the kernel images and modules + $grsec_denied + +# if sshd needs to be restarted, it can be done through the admin role +# restarting sshd should be followed immediately by a gradm -u + /usr/sbin/sshd + + /home/*/.gem/ruby/2.0.0/bin rx + /home/*/.rbenv/shims rx + /home/*/.rbenv/versions*/bin rx + /home/*/.cabal/bin rx + /home/*/dev/env rx + + -CAP_KILL + -CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG + -CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE + -CAP_NET_RAW + -CAP_MKNOD + -CAP_SYS_ADMIN + -CAP_SYS_RAWIO + -CAP_SYS_MODULE + -CAP_SYS_PTRACE + -CAP_NET_ADMIN + -CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + -CAP_NET_RAW + -CAP_SYS_CHROOT + -CAP_SYS_BOOT + -CAP_SETFCAP + -CAP_SYSLOG + +# RES_AS 100M 100M + +# connect 192.168.1.0/24:22 stream tcp +# bind 0.0.0.0 stream dgram tcp udp + +# the d flag protects /proc fd and mem entries for sshd +# all daemons should have 'p' in their subject mode to prevent +# an attacker from killing the service (and restarting it with trojaned +# config file or taking the port it reserved to run a trojaned service) + +subject /usr/sbin/sshd dpo + / + /* h + /bin/bash x + /dev h + /dev/log rw + /dev/random r + /dev/urandom r + /dev/null rw + /dev/ptmx rw + /dev/pts rw + /dev/tty rw + /dev/tty? rw + /etc r + /etc/grsec h + /home + /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys r + /root + /proc r + /proc/*/oom_adj rw + /proc/kcore h + /proc/sys h + /proc/sys/kernel/ngroups_max r + /selinux r + /usr/lib rx + /usr/share/zoneinfo r + /var/log + /var/mail + /var/log/lastlog rw + /var/log/wtmp w + /var/run + /run + /var/run/sshd + /var/run/utmp rw + /var/run/utmpx rw + /var/run/.nscd_socket rw + + -CAP_ALL + +CAP_CHOWN + +CAP_SETGID + +CAP_SETUID + +CAP_SYS_CHROOT + +CAP_SYS_RESOURCE + +CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG + +CAP_AUDIT_WRITE + # to access user keys + +CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE + +subject /usr/bin/Xorg + /dev/mem rw + + +CAP_SYS_ADMIN + +CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG + +CAP_SYS_RAWIO + +subject /usr/bin/ssh + /etc/ssh/ssh_config r + +subject /usr/bin/postgres + /dev/log rw + +subject /usr/bin/exim + /dev/log rw + +subject /usr/sbin/syslog-ng + +CAP_SYS_ADMIN + +subject /usr/sbin/rsyslogd + +CAP_SYS_ADMIN + +subject /usr/sbin/cron + /dev/log rw + +subject /usr/sbin/crond + /dev/log rw + +subject /bin/login + /dev/log rw + /var/log/wtmp w + /var/log/faillog rwcd + +subject /bin/su + /dev/log rw + +subject /usr/bin/sudo + /dev/log rw + +subject /sbin/agetty + /var/log/wtmp w + +subject /sbin/init + /var/log/wtmp w + +subject /usr/bin/xauth + /home r + /home/*/.Xauthority-* rwcdl + +# prevent ld.so breakouts of subjects with /lib rx + +# many distros clutter up /lib with shell scripts +# that can be easily hijacked for malicious purposes +subject /usr/lib o + / h + -CAP_ALL + connect disabled + bind disabled + +subject /usr/lib32 o + / h + -CAP_ALL + connect disabled + bind disabled + +subject /usr/lib/ld-linux.so.2 o + / h + -CAP_ALL + connect disabled + bind disabled + +subject /usr/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 o + / h + -CAP_ALL + connect disabled + bind disabled diff --git a/kernels/gradm/usr.patch b/kernels/gradm/usr.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b3e5e77ab --- /dev/null +++ b/kernels/gradm/usr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +diff --git a/gradm_adm.c b/gradm_adm.c +index bdcfd7d..9681b3c 100644 +--- a/gradm_adm.c ++++ b/gradm_adm.c +@@ -72,12 +72,13 @@ add_gradm_acl(struct role_acl *role) + + gradm_name = gr_strdup(gradm_realpath); + if (gr_enable && strcmp(gradm_name, GRADM_PATH)) { +- printf("You are attempting to use a gradm binary other " +- "than the installed version. Depending on your " ++ printf("You are attempting to use a gradm binary (%s) other " ++ "than the installed version (%s). Depending on your " + "policy, you could be locking yourself out of " + "your machine by enabling the RBAC system with " + "this binary. Press \'y\' if you wish to ignore " +- "this warning, or any other key to cancel.\n>"); ++ "this warning, or any other key to cancel.\n>", ++ gradm_name, GRADM_PATH); + if (getchar() != 'y') + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } +@@ -259,11 +260,6 @@ static void add_fulllearn_shutdown_acl(void) + ADD_OBJ("/dev/urandom", "r"); + ADD_OBJ("/dev/random", "r"); + ADD_OBJ("/etc", "r"); +- ADD_OBJ("/bin", "rx"); +- ADD_OBJ("/sbin", "rx"); +- ADD_OBJ("/lib", "rx"); +- ADD_OBJ("/lib32", "rx"); +- ADD_OBJ("/lib64", "rx"); + ADD_OBJ("/usr", "rx"); + ADD_OBJ("/proc", "r"); + ADD_OBJ("/boot", "h"); +@@ -276,9 +272,9 @@ static void add_fulllearn_shutdown_acl(void) + ADD_OBJ("/proc/slabinfo", "h"); + ADD_OBJ("/proc/modules", "h"); + ADD_OBJ("/proc/kallsyms", "h"); +- ADD_OBJ("/lib/modules", "hs"); +- ADD_OBJ("/lib32/modules", "hs"); +- ADD_OBJ("/lib64/modules", "hs"); ++ ADD_OBJ("/usr/lib/modules", "hs"); ++ ADD_OBJ("/usr/lib32/modules", "hs"); ++ ADD_OBJ("/usr/lib64/modules", "hs"); + ADD_OBJ("/etc/ssh", "h"); + add_cap_acl(current_subject, "-CAP_ALL", NULL); + +diff --git a/gradm_analyze.c b/gradm_analyze.c +index 74ec86f..da365a4 100644 +--- a/gradm_analyze.c ++++ b/gradm_analyze.c +@@ -778,17 +778,17 @@ analyze_acls(void) + errs_found++; + } + +- if (!stat("/lib/modules", &fstat) && !check_permission(role, def_acl, "/lib/modules", &chk)) { ++ if (!stat("/usr/lib/modules", &fstat) && !check_permission(role, def_acl, "/usr/lib/modules", &chk)) { + fprintf(stderr, +- "Writing access is allowed by role %s to /lib/modules, the directory which " ++ "Writing access is allowed by role %s to /usr/lib/modules, the directory which " + "holds kernel modules.\n\n", + role->rolename); + errs_found++; + } + +- if (!stat("/lib64/modules", &fstat) && !check_permission(role, def_acl, "/lib64/modules", &chk)) { ++ if (!stat("/usr/lib64/modules", &fstat) && !check_permission(role, def_acl, "/usr/lib64/modules", &chk)) { + fprintf(stderr, +- "Writing access is allowed by role %s to /lib64/modules, the directory which " ++ "Writing access is allowed by role %s to /usr/lib64/modules, the directory which " + "holds kernel modules.\n\n", + role->rolename); + errs_found++; +diff --git a/gradm_defs.h b/gradm_defs.h +index 961a7b9..56d6378 100644 +--- a/gradm_defs.h ++++ b/gradm_defs.h +@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ + #ifndef GRSEC_DIR + #define GRSEC_DIR "/etc/grsec" + #endif +-#define GRLEARN_PATH "/sbin/grlearn" +-#define GRADM_PATH "/sbin/gradm" +-#define GRPAM_PATH "/sbin/gradm_pam" ++#define GRLEARN_PATH "/usr/bin/grlearn" ++#define GRADM_PATH "/usr/bin/gradm" ++#define GRPAM_PATH "/usr/bin/gradm_pam" + #define GRDEV_PATH "/dev/grsec" + #define GR_POLICY_PATH GRSEC_DIR "/policy" + #define GR_PW_PATH GRSEC_DIR "/pw" +diff --git a/gradm_fulllearn.c b/gradm_fulllearn.c +index 4d10060..6ce744d 100644 +--- a/gradm_fulllearn.c ++++ b/gradm_fulllearn.c +@@ -449,8 +449,8 @@ static const char *initial_roles_str = + "\t/proc/slabinfo\th\n" + "\t/proc/modules\th\n" + "\t/proc/kallsyms\th\n" +-"\t/lib/modules\ths\n" +-"\t/lib64/modules\ths\n" ++"\t/usr/lib/modules\ths\n" ++"\t/usr/lib64/modules\ths\n" + "\t/etc/ssh\th\n" + "}\n\n" + "role admin sA\n" +@@ -463,10 +463,6 @@ static const char *initial_roles_str = + "\t/dev/urandom r\n" + "\t/dev/random r\n" + "\t/etc r\n" +-"\t/bin rx\n" +-"\t/sbin rx\n" +-"\t/lib rx\n" +-"\t/lib64 rx\n" + "\t/usr rx\n" + "\t/proc r\n" + "\t$grsec_denied\n" |