diff options
author | David P <megver83@parabola.nu> | 2018-01-05 23:42:45 -0300 |
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committer | David P <megver83@parabola.nu> | 2018-01-05 23:42:45 -0300 |
commit | dba7d654b0f3fc1cf9a749467464016fc7b2b13b (patch) | |
tree | d2f421d6c6d4e15ac65a2ef80d6c2d0365573900 /libre | |
parent | ea466373788409c3db888022adc1fff3c63a8d79 (diff) | |
download | abslibre-dba7d654b0f3fc1cf9a749467464016fc7b2b13b.tar.gz abslibre-dba7d654b0f3fc1cf9a749467464016fc7b2b13b.tar.bz2 abslibre-dba7d654b0f3fc1cf9a749467464016fc7b2b13b.zip |
libre/linux-libre: add Arch Linux security patches and fix objtool issue
Diffstat (limited to 'libre')
8 files changed, 551 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch b/libre/linux-libre/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..64341b9b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/libre/linux-libre/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> +Date: Fri, 31 May 2013 19:12:12 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/7] add sysctl to disallow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER by + default + +Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> +[bwh: Remove unneeded binary sysctl bits] +Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> +--- + kernel/fork.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +++ + 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c +index 500ce64517d93e68..35f5860958b40e9b 100644 +--- a/kernel/fork.c ++++ b/kernel/fork.c +@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ + + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS + #include <trace/events/task.h> ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++#else ++#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0 ++#endif + + /* + * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel +@@ -1554,6 +1559,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( + if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + ++ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); ++ + /* + * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads + * can only be started up within the thread group. +@@ -2347,6 +2356,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags) + if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) + unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; + ++ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) { ++ err = -EPERM; ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ goto bad_unshare_out; ++ } ++ + err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); + if (err) + goto bad_unshare_out; +diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c +index 56aca862c4f584f5..e8402ba393c1915d 100644 +--- a/kernel/sysctl.c ++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c +@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ extern int core_uses_pid; + extern char core_pattern[]; + extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit; + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++#endif + extern int pid_max; + extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max; + extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction; +@@ -513,6 +516,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++ { ++ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone", ++ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL + { + .procname = "tainted", +diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c +index c490f1e4313b998a..dd03bd39d7bf194d 100644 +--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c ++++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c +@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ + #include <linux/projid.h> + #include <linux/fs_struct.h> + ++/* sysctl */ ++int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++ + static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; + static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); + +-- +2.15.1 + diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch b/libre/linux-libre/0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8c23c9a54 --- /dev/null +++ b/libre/linux-libre/0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From 8c6956686606b9c3661e74a410c8cb2fc276c5ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <8c6956686606b9c3661e74a410c8cb2fc276c5ee.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com> +Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 16:26:40 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH 2/7] e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return + value. + +e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan() +are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when +phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: +Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the +return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first +function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise. + +Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list@eworm.de> +Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com> +Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047 +Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up") +Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list@eworm.de> +Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com> +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c +index d6d4ed7acf031172..31277d3bb7dc1241 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c +@@ -1367,22 +1367,25 @@ static s32 e1000_disable_ulp_lpt_lp(struct e1000_hw *hw, bool force) + * Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed. If a + * change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers + * to get the current speed/duplex if link exists. ++ * ++ * Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link ++ * up). + **/ + static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw) + { + struct e1000_mac_info *mac = &hw->mac; + s32 ret_val, tipg_reg = 0; + u16 emi_addr, emi_val = 0; + bool link; + u16 phy_reg; + + /* We only want to go out to the PHY registers to see if Auto-Neg + * has completed and/or if our link status has changed. The + * get_link_status flag is set upon receiving a Link Status + * Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt. + */ + if (!mac->get_link_status) +- return 0; ++ return 1; + + /* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports + * link. If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex +@@ -1613,10 +1616,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw) + * different link partner. + */ + ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw); +- if (ret_val) ++ if (ret_val) { + e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n"); ++ return ret_val; ++ } + +- return ret_val; ++ return 1; + } + + static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter) +-- +2.15.1 + diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch b/libre/linux-libre/0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7872e2a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/libre/linux-libre/0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From b81e273fb227373a2951c7256ab11a87d5333a9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <b81e273fb227373a2951c7256ab11a87d5333a9d.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +From: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 20:58:35 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 3/7] dccp: CVE-2017-8824: use-after-free in DCCP code + +Whenever the sock object is in DCCP_CLOSED state, +dccp_disconnect() must free dccps_hc_tx_ccid and +dccps_hc_rx_ccid and set to NULL. + +Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com> +Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> +--- + net/dccp/proto.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/dccp/proto.c b/net/dccp/proto.c +index b68168fcc06aa198..9d43c1f4027408f3 100644 +--- a/net/dccp/proto.c ++++ b/net/dccp/proto.c +@@ -259,25 +259,30 @@ int dccp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags) + { + struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); + struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); ++ struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk); + int err = 0; + const int old_state = sk->sk_state; + + if (old_state != DCCP_CLOSED) + dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_CLOSED); + + /* + * This corresponds to the ABORT function of RFC793, sec. 3.8 + * TCP uses a RST segment, DCCP a Reset packet with Code 2, "Aborted". + */ + if (old_state == DCCP_LISTEN) { + inet_csk_listen_stop(sk); + } else if (dccp_need_reset(old_state)) { + dccp_send_reset(sk, DCCP_RESET_CODE_ABORTED); + sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; + } else if (old_state == DCCP_REQUESTING) + sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; + + dccp_clear_xmit_timers(sk); ++ ccid_hc_rx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid, sk); ++ ccid_hc_tx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid, sk); ++ dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid = NULL; ++ dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid = NULL; + + __skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue); + __skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue); +-- +2.15.1 + diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch b/libre/linux-libre/0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4dca618a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/libre/linux-libre/0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From d03c0ef520f40c6de691c37e0f168c87b3423015 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <d03c0ef520f40c6de691c37e0f168c87b3423015.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> +Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 06:40:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in + xfrm_state_find." + +This reverts commit c9f3f813d462c72dbe412cee6a5cbacf13c4ad5e. + +This commit breaks transport mode when the policy template +has widlcard addresses configured, so revert it. + +Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> +--- + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +index 2a6093840e7e856e..6bc16bb61b5533ef 100644 +--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c ++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +@@ -1362,29 +1362,36 @@ xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy *policy, const struct flowi *fl, + struct net *net = xp_net(policy); + int nx; + int i, error; ++ xfrm_address_t *daddr = xfrm_flowi_daddr(fl, family); ++ xfrm_address_t *saddr = xfrm_flowi_saddr(fl, family); + xfrm_address_t tmp; + + for (nx = 0, i = 0; i < policy->xfrm_nr; i++) { + struct xfrm_state *x; +- xfrm_address_t *local; +- xfrm_address_t *remote; ++ xfrm_address_t *remote = daddr; ++ xfrm_address_t *local = saddr; + struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl = &policy->xfrm_vec[i]; + +- remote = &tmpl->id.daddr; +- local = &tmpl->saddr; +- if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) { +- error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif, +- &tmp, remote, +- tmpl->encap_family, 0); +- if (error) +- goto fail; +- local = &tmp; ++ if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL || ++ tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET) { ++ remote = &tmpl->id.daddr; ++ local = &tmpl->saddr; ++ if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) { ++ error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif, ++ &tmp, remote, ++ tmpl->encap_family, 0); ++ if (error) ++ goto fail; ++ local = &tmp; ++ } + } + + x = xfrm_state_find(remote, local, fl, tmpl, policy, &error, family); + + if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) { + xfrm[nx++] = x; ++ daddr = remote; ++ saddr = local; + continue; + } + if (x) { +-- +2.15.1 + diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch b/libre/linux-libre/0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..edd7b24a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/libre/linux-libre/0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 3721d64246982f91a5bf863fc17ac60ff722e0c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <3721d64246982f91a5bf863fc17ac60ff722e0c4.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> +Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 10:44:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 5/7] xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read on socket policy + lookup. + +When we do tunnel or beet mode, we pass saddr and daddr from the +template to xfrm_state_find(), this is ok. On transport mode, +we pass the addresses from the flowi, assuming that the IP +addresses (and address family) don't change during transformation. +This assumption is wrong in the IPv4 mapped IPv6 case, packet +is IPv4 and template is IPv6. + +Fix this by catching address family missmatches of the policy +and the flow already before we do the lookup. + +Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> +Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> +--- + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +index 6bc16bb61b5533ef..50c5f46b5cca942e 100644 +--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c ++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +@@ -1169,9 +1169,15 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir, + again: + pol = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_policy[dir]); + if (pol != NULL) { +- bool match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family); ++ bool match; + int err = 0; + ++ if (pol->family != family) { ++ pol = NULL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family); + if (match) { + if ((sk->sk_mark & pol->mark.m) != pol->mark.v) { + pol = NULL; +-- +2.15.1 + diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch b/libre/linux-libre/0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0a54ce129 --- /dev/null +++ b/libre/linux-libre/0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +From a79cb4d4e540c72a601ca0494e914565c16e2893 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <a79cb4d4e540c72a601ca0494e914565c16e2893.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> +Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 07:09:19 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 6/7] cgroup: fix css_task_iter crash on CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC + +While teaching css_task_iter to handle skipping over tasks which +aren't group leaders, bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to +css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS") introduced a +silly bug. + +CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS is implemented by repeating +css_task_iter_advance() while the advanced cursor is pointing to a +non-leader thread. However, the cursor variable, @l, wasn't updated +when the iteration has to advance to the next css_set and the +following repetition would operate on the terminal @l from the +previous iteration which isn't pointing to a valid task leading to +oopses like the following or infinite looping. + + BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000254 + IP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0 + PGD 0 P4D 0 + Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP + ... + CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.14.4-200.fc26.x86_64 #1 + Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME B350M-A, BIOS 3203 11/09/2017 + task: ffff88c4baee8000 task.stack: ffff96d5c3158000 + RIP: 0010:__task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0 + RSP: 0018:ffff96d5c315bd50 EFLAGS: 00010206 + RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88c4b68c6000 RCX: 0000000000000250 + RDX: ffffffffa5e47960 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88c490f6ab00 + RBP: ffff96d5c315bd50 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000005 + R10: ffff88c4be006b80 R11: ffff88c42f1b8004 R12: ffff96d5c315bf18 + R13: ffff88c42d7dd200 R14: ffff88c490f6a510 R15: ffff88c4b68c6000 + FS: 00007f9446f8ea00(0000) GS:ffff88c4be680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 + CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 + CR2: 0000000000000254 CR3: 00000007f956f000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 + Call Trace: + cgroup_procs_show+0x19/0x30 + cgroup_seqfile_show+0x4c/0xb0 + kernfs_seq_show+0x21/0x30 + seq_read+0x2ec/0x3f0 + kernfs_fop_read+0x134/0x180 + __vfs_read+0x37/0x160 + ? security_file_permission+0x9b/0xc0 + vfs_read+0x8e/0x130 + SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 + entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 + RIP: 0033:0x7f94455f942d + RSP: 002b:00007ffe81ba2d00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 + RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005574e2233f00 RCX: 00007f94455f942d + RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00005574e2321a90 RDI: 000000000000002b + RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00005574e2321a90 R09: 00005574e231de60 + R10: 00007f94458c8b38 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f94458c8ae0 + R13: 00007ffe81ba3800 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005574e2116560 + Code: 04 74 0e 89 f6 48 8d 04 76 48 8d 04 c5 f0 05 00 00 48 8b bf b8 05 00 00 48 01 c7 31 c0 48 8b 0f 48 85 c9 74 18 8b b2 30 08 00 00 <3b> 71 04 77 0d 48 c1 e6 05 48 01 f1 48 3b 51 38 74 09 5d c3 8b + RIP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0 RSP: ffff96d5c315bd50 + +Fix it by moving the initialization of the cursor below the repeat +label. While at it, rename it to @next for readability. + +Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> +Fixes: bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ +Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> +Reported-by: Bronek Kozicki <brok@incorrekt.com> +Reported-by: George Amanakis <gamanakis@gmail.com> +Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> +--- + kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 14 ++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +index 44857278eb8aa6a2..030e4286f14c715e 100644 +--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c ++++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +@@ -4059,26 +4059,24 @@ static void css_task_iter_advance_css_set(struct css_task_iter *it) + + static void css_task_iter_advance(struct css_task_iter *it) + { +- struct list_head *l = it->task_pos; ++ struct list_head *next; + + lockdep_assert_held(&css_set_lock); +- WARN_ON_ONCE(!l); +- + repeat: + /* + * Advance iterator to find next entry. cset->tasks is consumed + * first and then ->mg_tasks. After ->mg_tasks, we move onto the + * next cset. + */ +- l = l->next; ++ next = it->task_pos->next; + +- if (l == it->tasks_head) +- l = it->mg_tasks_head->next; ++ if (next == it->tasks_head) ++ next = it->mg_tasks_head->next; + +- if (l == it->mg_tasks_head) ++ if (next == it->mg_tasks_head) + css_task_iter_advance_css_set(it); + else +- it->task_pos = l; ++ it->task_pos = next; + + /* if PROCS, skip over tasks which aren't group leaders */ + if ((it->flags & CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS) && it->task_pos && +-- +2.15.1 + diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch b/libre/linux-libre/0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f3af870c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/libre/linux-libre/0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 51786b65797aed683ca72293a3cb86a2cab987c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <51786b65797aed683ca72293a3cb86a2cab987c0.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> +From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> +Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2017 23:43:54 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 7/7] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors + +AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel +page table isolation feature protects against. The AMD microarchitecture +does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that +access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode +when that access would result in a page fault. + +Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting +the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI +is set. + +Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> +Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> +--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +index f2a94dfb434e9a7c..b1be494ab4e8badf 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -899,8 +899,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); + +- /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */ +- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE); ++ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) ++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE); + + fpu__init_system(c); + +-- +2.15.1 + diff --git a/libre/linux-libre/PKGBUILD b/libre/linux-libre/PKGBUILD index ddcb8831d..61d972543 100644 --- a/libre/linux-libre/PKGBUILD +++ b/libre/linux-libre/PKGBUILD @@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ source=( # other patches '0001-usb-serial-gadget-no-TTY-hangup-on-USB-disconnect-WI.patch' '0002-fix-Atmel-maXTouch-touchscreen-support.patch' + '0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch' + '0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch' + '0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch' + '0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch' + '0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch' + '0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch' + '0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch' ) sha512sums=('0d4b0b8ec1ffc39c59295adf56f6a2cccf77cad56d8a8bf8072624bbb52ba3e684147ebed91d1528d2685423dd784c5fca0f3650f874f2b93cfc6b7689b9a87f' 'SKIP' @@ -85,7 +92,14 @@ sha512sums=('0d4b0b8ec1ffc39c59295adf56f6a2cccf77cad56d8a8bf8072624bbb52ba3e6841 '6c93bc1e8d580af288921e10c456bdbda1dcb6d6f08c111cddaf9a32b43c2df41b50136bc09aaac1da9c3cae667bba6e075d590dcc465107ae6e2c3dcf7da657' 'f813d51834cedc23fabbb6060709a24f29969fea5aeb963fdeddb79723014ffc0c6d34be45eea8419d5087a5a9c561a42a113d667f03625283f2f2fc68196545' '02af4dd2a007e41db0c63822c8ab3b80b5d25646af1906dc85d0ad9bb8bbf5236f8e381d7f91cf99ed4b0978c50aee37cb9567cdeef65b7ec3d91b882852b1af' - 'b8fe56e14006ab866970ddbd501c054ae37186ddc065bb869cf7d18db8c0d455118d5bda3255fb66a0dde38b544655cfe9040ffe46e41d19830b47959b2fb168') + 'b8fe56e14006ab866970ddbd501c054ae37186ddc065bb869cf7d18db8c0d455118d5bda3255fb66a0dde38b544655cfe9040ffe46e41d19830b47959b2fb168' + '05f2c577450cfeae4b66a7d022a9dd0dab0dbf36e9738423efa8f45aaf0755b48a89f1f88b042946205e681458f76c5c5177c16869094839b7b234e0e2b27511' + 'fd9bdc818326fa36c9f1813d0d1821de5e325b646e1c307c197ad38bada7f298d35b4bc1bbf1c2854689f3ba71144879e799a1123037caccd6e3f64edfc22d54' + '814517d08c35cc886fe3382619d41107d6139a703c27186d0ce58e187eaf4e84891572e58246750ac8602555794ed6f74d946565b98860787a0aa617fb946dda' + '7a5a6edf0879e59437b03166882e5afdc2dea9087819b1ada3aee22861a041896e305f136c61f0b8365cddff34852620fe2b3c51b5408d4c243a840b3dfe3059' + 'e6605e923c967b5f8db619868b15ea5b0d4254c62cf12bb920f38659933d6ca25a643d3e044c4915a8309071461f5f14c55d0aa0329c113bce4780d4fa3afbb7' + '0dec1482efe6e5d762a3061f365e43191484f055b738112452b8ca39e162b935d99cf16b25c0b253d6b532fabc54bde2f5c09be91887156ed6ae06d1558f94b9' + 'fda8b429d98b9017e0d72c91054c53afec6fab41abb06724bc1ce020863956215a3cdeb7692297d533d7426f8e2cc7f8d03c2570abf71e4b1d4f41fdb5fe63f0') validpgpkeys=( '474402C8C582DAFBE389C427BCB7CF877E7D47A7' # Alexandre Oliva '6DB9C4B4F0D8C0DC432CF6E4227CA7C556B2BA78' # David P. @@ -108,6 +122,7 @@ prepare() { if [ "${_pkgbasever}" != "${_pkgver}" ]; then patch -p1 -i ../patch-${_pkgbasever}-${_pkgver} fi + chmod +x tools/objtool/sync-check.sh # GNU patch doesn't support git-style file mode if [ "${CARCH}" = "armv7h" ]; then # RCN patch (CM3 firmware deblobbed and AUFS removed) @@ -132,8 +147,29 @@ prepare() { install -m644 -t drivers/video/logo \ "${srcdir}/logo_linux_"{clut224.ppm,vga16.ppm,mono.pbm} + # security patches + # add latest fixes from stable queue, if needed # http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git + + # disable USER_NS for non-root users by default + patch -Np1 -i ../0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch + + # https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/56575 + patch -Np1 -i ../0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch + + # https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8824 + patch -Np1 -i ../0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch + + # https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/56605 + patch -Np1 -i ../0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch + patch -Np1 -i ../0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch + + # https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/56846 + patch -Np1 -i ../0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch + + # For AMD processors, keep PTI off by default + #patch -Np1 -i ../0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch # maintain the TTY over USB disconnects # http://www.coreboot.org/EHCI_Gadget_Debug |