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authorDavid P <megver83@parabola.nu>2020-04-27 18:24:44 -0400
committerDavid P <megver83@parabola.nu>2020-04-27 18:28:38 -0400
commita5dea4f2300de846d3d9967ffdfd3b3bea4e8d70 (patch)
tree8fdf7e40b41e26cf8a1249fd3d384ae2bfac6823 /kernels/linux-libre-xtreme/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
parent940cbcb215b3a06b0f6a85c0700d6d642d1bebc8 (diff)
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rmpkg: kernels/linux-libre-xtreme
Reason: Linux-libre{-hardened} enables all LSM by default in i686 and x86_64 since a long time. Although it kinda made sense because it had AppArmor enabled by default, it's not worth to maintain it since anyone can enable it by passing a kernel parameter, as explained in the AppArmor page in ArchWiki. This isn't the case for armv7h, but will see if users want AppArmor for ARM in the future. Signed-off-by: David P <megver83@parabola.nu>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernels/linux-libre-xtreme/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch')
-rw-r--r--kernels/linux-libre-xtreme/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch132
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 132 deletions
diff --git a/kernels/linux-libre-xtreme/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch b/kernels/linux-libre-xtreme/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f2a08ca64..000000000
--- a/kernels/linux-libre-xtreme/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-From b7ea2fa503702cbbd1eb2d38371b5650aab88666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig)" <jan.steffens@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 04:53:20 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 01/11] ZEN: Add sysctl and CONFIG to disallow unprivileged
- CLONE_NEWUSER
-
-Our default behavior continues to match the vanilla kernel.
----
- init/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- kernel/fork.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- kernel/user_namespace.c | 7 +++++++
- 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 74297c392dd4..44221292a9eb 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1102,6 +1102,22 @@ config USER_NS
-
- If unsure, say N.
-
-+config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
-+ bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
-+ default y
-+ depends on USER_NS
-+ help
-+ When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
-+ new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
-+ has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
-+ exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
-+ paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
-+
-+ This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
-+ kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
-+
-+ If unsure, say Y.
-+
- config PID_NS
- bool "PID Namespaces"
- default y
-diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
-index 080809560072..1cb7b827b57b 100644
---- a/kernel/fork.c
-+++ b/kernel/fork.c
-@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@
-
- #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
- #include <trace/events/task.h>
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#else
-+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
-+#endif
-
- /*
- * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
-@@ -1843,6 +1848,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
- if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
-+ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-+
- /*
- * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
- * can only be started up within the thread group.
-@@ -2923,6 +2932,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
- if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
- unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
-
-+ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
-+ err = -EPERM;
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+ goto bad_unshare_out;
-+ }
-+
- err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
- if (err)
- goto bad_unshare_out;
-diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
-index 70665934d53e..9797869ed829 100644
---- a/kernel/sysctl.c
-+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
-@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ extern int core_uses_pid;
- extern char core_pattern[];
- extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
- #endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#endif
- extern int pid_max;
- extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
- extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
-@@ -546,6 +549,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
- },
- #endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-+ {
-+ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone",
-+ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone,
-+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
-+ .mode = 0644,
-+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
-+ },
-+#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
- {
- .procname = "tainted",
-diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-index 8eadadc478f9..c36ecd19562c 100644
---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
-+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
- #include <linux/bsearch.h>
- #include <linux/sort.h>
-
-+/* sysctl */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
-+int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
-+#else
-+int unprivileged_userns_clone;
-+#endif
-+
- static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
-
---
-2.26.0
-